Collaboration and authority in the collective action problem
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Abstract
Direct reciprocity and contingent collaboration deter opportunistic behavior in social predicaments. However, in large collectives, these mechanisms may lose efficacy as they rely on individuals' influence. Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategies in the collective action problem reshape our understanding of individual influence. Our study introduces a theoretical framework extending these strategies to multiplayer dilemmas, offering insights into lone participants' impact. We delineate intriguing sub-classes of strategies: fair, extortionate (advantageous), and generous (disadvantageous). We explore models showcasing strategic enhancement through alignment with others. The present study elucidates the significance of individual decision-making and collective coordination as essential components contributing to favorable outcomes within expansive group settings.
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